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Once more the flexibility of the conrnon law has
been put to the test ; once-,,more it
questions,

as to a

has answered new

new instrunent of coinnerce-the

telephone.

For barely forty years the judges of our

courts have

been drawing heavily upon the resources of

analogy that they might solve
gard to the

knotty questions

in

re-

duties and liabilities of its twin sister,

the telegraph.

And before

that law has become settled,

inventive ,genius has projected into the legal world a
new

but in many respects similar instrunent of coirnuni-

cation,

whose duties and liabilities

fixed by the courts.

But, though a decade has elapsed

since its

introduction,

ters

been few and limited.

have

be assigned for this.

must likewise be

the adjudications

in

And three

these matcauses may

The courts of Great 7ritain

within two years after the first telephone line was used
decided that a

conversation

through a

telephone

is

a

"telegram" and that the telephone business, whether
occupied in

the transmission

of separate messages or

in

maintaining exchanges, comes within the English statute

2
of 1869, giving to the postmaster general the exclusive
control of the business of transmitting messages by
telegraph.
244.)

(Atty Geni

v Edison Telephone Co.,

6 Q.B.D.

Consequently, no cases involving telephone law

are to be found in
reason is

the English reports.

Then, a second

the general acceptance by the coirnercial

world of the analogy of the telephone to the telegraph
business and its

willingness to be satisfied

if

it

gets

the same treatment from the former as from the latter.
Finally,

all the telephone

almost the very first

interests of this country from

have been concentrated

in

one

great company-

The American Bell Telephone Co.,

Massachusetts-

which fully aware of the fact that comnon

law cannot be killed in the womb like

of

legislative enact-

ments and yet is as obligatory as statute law

has shrewd-

ly avoided litigation; in fact, it has assisted its
mighty ally, the Western Union Telegraph Company, in
destroying or absorbing their litigous competitors.
The Nature of the Business.
A magnetic telephone is a mechanical device capable
of transmitting articulate speech through wires by the
power of magnetism and electricity.

(American Rapid Tel.

3
Co. v Connecticut Teleph. Co.,

49 Conn. 371.)

So it

is practicable for the general public to make individual
use of it ; and the business which the telephone companies have undertaken may be divided into two quite
ferent branches;

(a) the transmission of separate messa-

ges from place to place under
those

circumstances similar to

incident to the telegraph business is

(b) the other

dif-

one branch

is the maintenance of telephone exchanges,

a system by which the offices or residences of all the
individual members of the exchange are each connected
with a central station where an agent of the exchange
is always in readiness at call to connect one subscribor's

instrument with another's

that

they may comnunicate
bLLSinPs

directly with each other.

This double nature of theA

undertaken must ever be borne in

mind in

the legal con-

sideration of telephone companies' relations to the
public.
A Cornon Carrier of News.
In order to properly discuss the rights, duties and
liabilities of telephone companies, it is necessary
to ascertain what is the nature of their relation to the
public.

The telephone is an indispensable instrument of

4
commerce.

The companies hold themselves out as public

servants and undertake not only to perform similar duties
to those of telegraph companies, i.e. to send dispatches
from their public offices, but also to supply a public
demand beyond that undertaken by the telegraph, to send
messages

from their instruments,

one of which they pro-

pose to supply to each person or interest requiring it,
if conditions are reasonably favorable.
braska Teleph. Co.,

(State v Ne-

17 Neb. 126 ; 52 Am. Rep. 404.)

They should,therefore, be considered as one of the great
(State of Missouri, ex rel.

class of coirnon carriers.

Balt. & Ohio Tel. Co., v Bell Telehll. Co., 23 Fed. Rep.
59. Central Union Teleph. Co.,
b N.E. Rep. 571.

Wolf v Vf.

contraGrinnell v W. U. Tel.
son voV[.U.Tel.

CO.,

52 17.Y.

v Atla,-ic & Pac. Tel. Co.,

v Bradbury, 106 Ind. 1

U. Tel. Co.,
Co.,

62 Pa. St. 83.

113 Mass.

Superior Ct.

299.

232.

1IcPherSchwartz

18 Hun. 157.) But it is a

coirinon carrier of news, rather than of goods.

(Hocket

v State, 105 Ind. 250; 5 N.E.Rep. 178. State ex rel.
American Union Tel. Co.v

the Bell Teleph. Co. 10 Cent.

L.j.435.)
Only one of the earlier cases held that a telegraph

5
company is a common carrier.
13 Cal. 422

(Parks v

; 73 Am. Dec. 589.)

others have hesitated

in

Alta Cal. Tel. Co

The judges in all the

taking that step and have

spoken of them as quasi public servants(Ayers v Tel. Co.,
79 1.1e.

493.),

telegraph

or said with justice

companies are not,

James

strictly

:

"Although
common

speaking,

carriers for the reason that they do not have

tangible

possession of goods which can be stolen or destroyed,
yet from the public nature

of their

employment

the im-

portant matters confided wholly to their care, and the
skill and fidelity required in the performance of their
duties, their legal characteristics become so analogous
to those of carriers,

that the law must consider

them as

such, subject only to such modifications as the peculiar
nature of their business renders absolutely necessary."
(Baldwin v U. S. Tel. Co.,

1 Lans. 125.)

Earl, in Breese v U. S. Tel.

Co.

(4

Commissioner

1T.Y. 132) ) says

that telegraph companies may in one sense be called common carriers as they are engaged in a public employment
and are bound to transmit for all persons messages delivered to them for that purpose

; and then he states the

coranon objection to calling them coimmon carriers,

that

they are not insurers like the comnon carriers of goods
but rather limit their liability by contract and by the
nature of their business
we think,

; and finally he asserts what,

should be the accepted doctrine of the rela-

tion of telephone and telegraph companies to
and one which telephone

the public

cases by adopting have led re-

cent telegraph cases to adopt (Central U. Teleph. Co. v
Bradbury,106 Ind. 1 ; 5 N.E. Rep. 571.
Tel. C0.)

when he

says,

Wolfsk hi

v W.U.

"We should reach the same con-

clusion if we held that the defendant was a coinmon carrier with all the liabilities which attach to such carriers at coinnon law".

The courts took their stand

against the coinmon carrier theory because the telegraph
companies led them to believe that the

companies could

not insure accuracy in the management of their mysterious

4gent on account of the startling and unknown at-

mospheric influences with which they had to contend and
the

imperfection of their

telegraphic instruments.

But

railroad companies are now held as insurers although
they suffer great losses through accidents the

causes of

which baffle the scientific knowledge of this age.

The

writers on bailments also have been in doubt as to wheth-

er their subject includes telegraph and telephone companics.

(Schouler on Bailments, pp 277,27/M.

on Carriers, p. 398.)
Telegraph" says

Redfield

Gray in his "Comnunication by

"A telegraph company,

therefore,

either

because it undertakes to comnunicate intelligence by
telegraph for such as choose to employ it, or because
the right of eminent domain is invoked in its favor, is,
as a common carrier is, in the exercise of an occupation
of a public nature."

The Civil Code of Dakota, the

Civil Code of California (as originally adopted) and
the proposed Civil Code of New York very properly say :
"Every one

who offers to the public to carry persons,

property or messages is

a coinon carrier of whatever he

thus offers to carry.

(Civil Code of Dakota,secS.l1285,

1286.)

But in 1874 the California Code was amended so

as to except telegraphic messages from this provision
and the section as to the care due prom telegraph companies was repealed.

(Cal. Civil Code,secs. 2207,2208.)

And why cannot telegraph and telephone
under the head of common carriers ?

companies come
The leading fea-

tures of coranon carriers are that they are public servants or persons holding themselves out to the public as

ready to carry for any one
rate

who applies at

a uniform

; and that they were held to be insurers, at first

without the right of contracting against the loss of the
goods they
use the

carried.

By the time

the

telegraph caine into

courts had decided that comnon carriers

could

contract against losses arising from any cause but their
own negligence.

And in as much as in the first case

reported, where there was no special contract attached
to the

telegram,

the judge

said

the mistake

probably

arose from atmospheric influences (which may properly be
classed under the head of acts of
limited the damages to

God) and therefore

the cost of sending the telegram

and since in all the other cases there has been some
sort of contract as to liability, it cannot be said that
in the absence of contract the courts would, under exactly similar circumstances, hold telegraph and telephone
companies to a
carriers.

less responsibility

coinon

All these remarks apply to both branches

the telephone business,
have been in

than they do

regard

although the

to the exchange

the telegraph and telephone

of

decisions cited
business.

companies have

the

Then,
common

carrier's lien and can withhold the delivery of a mes-

9
sage until the charges for transmission have been paid.
(Scott & Jarnegin on Telegraph, sec. 120.)
the courts constantly refer to railroad

Further,

companies and

other carriers of passengers as coiron carriers.

Cer-

tainly, passengers are not goods; nor can it be said that
the judges class these public servants as coimnon carriers
because their

liability

carrier of goods.

is

the

same as that

For it is not.

conclude that there are

of a corrnon

IIence we may safely

cormnon carriers of passengers,

of goods, and of messages, whose obligations to
public are the same,

but whose liabilities

are

the
commensu-

rate with the objects carried or the peculiar business
undertaken.

And all

these are

comnon carriers.

LiLhts of Telephone Companies.
I'ext, what rights have telephone
certainly have the same rights
given

telegraplP

companies

companies ?

They

and privileges that are

(Wisconsin Teleph.

Co.

v City

of Oskosh, 62 Wis. 32)

; and these have the rights given

all public servants.

The statutes of most states give

telephone

companies the right to occupy public roads and

the right of eminent domain.
Ohio St. 296. 2

T.Y. Rev. Stat

(State v Teleph. Co.,

36

p. 1720. Concord P.R.v

10
Greely, 17 N.H. 47.
53 Ala. 211.
iLi ALA.

L.

New Orleans Tel. v Southern Tel. Co.,

A case in the MTissouri Sup. Ct.,

of So.

Sci.

I69.)

cited,

They have the right to

make reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of
of their business.
Young v V. U.

Tel.

(7reese v U.S.Tel. Co.,
Co.,

65 1,1.Y.

& P. Tel. Co. 18 hun 157.)

163.

48 IU.Y. 132.

Schwartz v Atlantic

These regulations must

not

contravene the constitution or laws of the country in
which the corporation exists,
or public policy.

And whether they do so or not is

to be determined by the court.
62 Pa.

St.

18:5.

\Y.

or violate the corunon law

U.

Tel.

Co.,

(Wolf v W.U.Tel.
v Graham,

I

Col.

Co.,
230 ;

Allen Tel. Cases 578 ; 10 Ain. L. Reg. 319. True v International Tel. Co.,

60 i e. 9.)

They may require messages

to be prepaid(Galcna R.R. v Rae, 18 Ill. 488) ; and
even require

one asking for an answer to prepay the

charges of the answer.
28 Fed. Rep. 181.)

(Hewlett v V1. U. Tel. Co.,

They are under no obligation to

contract to conunicate an illegal or irmnoral message.
But they decide at their peril what is excluded by those
terms.

(Gray on Tel.,

2 S. W. Rep. 485.)

sec. 15. Smith

However,

if

v U., U. Tel. Co.,

a subscriber

"daims"

the

company over the wire,

under

a regulation against

im-

proper or vulgar language, he forfeits his right to use
the instrument.

(Pugh v Teleph. 27 Al. L. J.

162.)

Duties and Obligations.
The telephone, by the necessities of comnerce and
by public use, has become a public servant, a factor
in
the

the commerce

of the nation and of a great portion of

civilized world, and is to all intents and purposes

a part of the telegraphic

system of the country

; in so

far as it has been introduced for public use and has
undertaken to supply a public demand beyond that undertaken by the

telegraph, so far should it be held to

the

same obligations as the telegraph and other public servants.

(State v Nebraska Teleph. Co. 17 Neb. 126 ; 52

Am.

409.)

Rep.

Telephone

to any individual or

companies are bound to

supply

company (even though it be a

telegraph company applying) instruments and connection
with their exchanges and to receive

dispatches from and

for other telephone lines, and from and for any telegraph lines, and from and for any individual, and on
payment of their charges for connection or for transmitting dispatches, as established by the rules and regula-

12

tions

of the company,

to transmit the same with impar-

tiality and good faith.
Neb. 126 ; 52 an.

Rep. 409.

36 Ohio St. 296.)

17

State v Bell Teleph. Co.,

These comnon law duties have been in

many states placed
ch-.

(State v Nob. Teleph. Co.,

4 Ohio Statutes,

upon

the statute books.

secs.

349 2,

3471.)

(Title 2,

There have been

no adjudications in respect to the obligations of telephone companies where they have undertaken no more than
telegraph companies.

For it seems to

have been ac-

cepted without question that their obligations under
those circumstances are exactly those of telegraph companies.
On the contrary, telephone companies carrying on
exchanges have persistently fought against their duty to
furnish the facilities of the exchange to any person or
corporation desiring them and offering to comply with
their regulations.

The first

courts was an application
Louis in

May,

188O,

case to come before the

to the Circuit Court of St.

by the American Union Telegraph Co.

for a mandamus to compel the Bell Telephone Co. to connect the relator's office with the telephone exchange
in St. Louis.

(State,ex rel. An.U.Tel.Co. v sell Teleph-

Co.,

10 Cent. L. J.

465.)

Judge Thayer held that

the

principles of law applicable to railroad companies and
other common carriers unquestionably applied to
and telephone

companies

telegraph

; that, instead of maintaining

offices in charge of its own agents for the reception
and transmizsion of messages at certain designated points
the Bell Teleph.

Co.

offices and hotels

supplies instruments
contiguous

to its

to residences,

main line

and makes

all proper connections with such main line at uniform
rates, and holds itself out to

the world as prepared to

supply all persons with such facilities for cormnunication
who reside or occupy offices contiguous to its established line, and therefore in refusing to grant

to the re-

lator such facilities as it affords to other customers
it has violated an imperative duty imposed upon it by
law.

Six months later,

the same court

the same

Bell Teleph.

carne again before

; and the telephone Co. alleged that it

had acquired the right to use the
Am.

case

Co.,

telephone from the

the ovmer of the patent,under

a

license, by whose terms it was provided, (1) that the
telephone company's patrons should not use the telephone
for

"transmitting messages for which toll is paid to

14
any one but the local company, nor for transmitting market quotations, or news for sale or publication ; (2)
that the telephone

company should not connect any of its

offices with any telegraph company's offices or line,
and that no telegraph company should be allowed to become a subscriber."

The court (Judge Thayer) ruled

(11 Cent. L.J. 360 ; 22 Al. L.J. 364)
clause of the contract,

if

that the second

enforced as valid, would com-

pel the company to discriiriyate

against a class of individ-

uals or corporations, to withhold facilities for the
transaction of business from one class of citizens which
it accords to others.
public policy.

This was contrary to law and

A public servant cannot avoid the per-

formance of any part of the duty it ov:res to the entire
public by any contract obligation which it may enter
into,

even with a patentee of an invention.

This con-

clusion did not deprive an inventor of any of the privileges intended to be secured to him by letters-patent.
The telegraph company may use the telephone for the same
purpose at least that other subscribers are now using it.
About a year later, the Louisville Chancery Court
(Louisville Transfer Co. v Am.

Dist. Teleph.Co.,Ky.L.

15
Journ. 144 ; 24 Al. L.J. 22"3)

restrained a company from

removing the telephone from the
pany,

which was a

rival

of the

nishing carriages,omnibusos

office of a transfer corntelephone

and coupees.

company in

fur-

Chancellor

Edwards in the opinion said : "Plaintiff and defendant
are not rivals

in

the telephone

business

; and as

to

that part of defendant's business, it occupies the same
position towards

the plaintiff

rest of the public.

as it

does toward the

The principles announced in the

opinion by Judge Thayer (supra)

should determine this

controversy.
After this preliminary skirmish, the Supreme Court
of Ohio was called upon to determine whether the Columbus Telephone Company

could rightfully refuse to supply

two rivals of the Western Union Tel. Co. with connection
with its exchange that they might by the means of it
collect and distribute dispatches

; and sometime

during;

the closing months of 1881 a decision (State,ex rel. Am.
Union Tel. Co. and B. & 0. Tel. Co. v Bell Teleph. Co.
et al,36 Ohio St. 296) was rendered which has been a
leading case ever since.
the defense that the local

Here great stress was laid
telephone

on

company was not the

16
owner of the patented instruments

but merely the licensee

of the American Bell Teleph. Co. of Massachusetts, under
an agreement to turn over to the Western Union Tel. Co.
all messages for electrical transmission outside of its
territory.

The court held that, under the Ohio statutes

preventing discrimination by telegraph and telephone companies, the telephone company must receive dispatches
from or for the relators, without discrimination in re
spect to

-

time or manner of transmission and could not

shield itself behind any self-imposed restrictions contained in

the contract with the American Bell Telephone

Company.

The local company had no right to engage in

business unless it

acquired the rights which were neces-

sary to discharging its duties to the public.
Justice McIlvaine further said :
Teleph. Co.

(which was a

Chief

"The American Bell

defendant in the suit) cannot

be permitted to operate a line or system of telephones,
in

this state,

in

the face

ly or through the agency of

of the statute either directlicensees, without impar-

tiality, or in other words, with discriminations against
any member of the general public who is

willing and

ready to comply with the conditions imposed upon all

17
other patrons or customers who are in like circumstances.
The use of tangible property which comes into existence
by the application of discovery is not beyong the control
of state legislation, simply because the patentee acquires a monoply in his discovery.

Public wvrlfare re-

quires that there should be no discrimination.
of mandamus to put in
made peremptory.

"

The writ

the desired instrument should be

Hardly a year was gone when the

Supreme Court of Connecticut was asked to pass upon an
exactly similar state of facts.

(Am. Rapid Tel. Co.

v Conn. Teleph. Co., 49 Conn. 352.)

The telephone coin-

pany set up the same defense as in the Ohio casecontract with the Bell Company.

the

The court took an op-

posite position and said that a mandamus cannot issue
for the American Bell Telephone Company is the exclusive
owner of tre patent, and the Connecticut Telephone Co.
has purchased only the right to use the patented articles
in

a certain way and it

is

not within the power of the

court to enlarge or diminish the purchase.

The Connecti-

cut Telephone Co. is not in a similar position to that
of railroad companies or proprietors of grain elevators,
for it

has never declared to the public that it

had the

right to use telephones in any other way or on other

18
terms than it is ready to extend to the demanding company.

The utmost reach of the Connecticut statute

(which is almost word for word like the Ohio statute)
is

to require the defendant to make an impartial use of

such rights or privileges as it possesses.

The statute

cannot confer power upon courts either to order the local company to buy that which cannot be bought or to use
the property of another without his consent.
lature

may deny them the use of highways,

transfer the property of one

The legis-

but it

cannot

to another without compensa-

tion, even for the public good.

Further the American

Bell Telephone company is located in another state and is
not a party to this proceeding.

Its lessee cannot con-

fer authority upon our courts to confiscate
rights of the lessor.

the reserved

Our courts may stop the misuse by

the defendant bf its limited rights, but the American
Bell Teleph. Co. is not concluded by the judgment that
it has dedicated its patent

to the public.

Which has

the better reasoning, the Connecticut or the Ohio case ?
We must confess that we prefer the Ohio case

; for the

Connecticut judges completely ignore the statute and
base their ruling

largely on the fact that the Bell Com-

pany is the exclusive owner of the patent, a theory

19
untenable in connection with Patterson v Kentucky (97 U.S,
501).

However, let us see how these two contrary de-

cisions have been regarded by the courts.
In i885^Balt & 0. Telegraph Co. applied to the
United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Missour,
for a mandamus to compel the Bell Telephone Co. of Missouri to put a telephone in its office.

The Court

(Brewer, Circuit Judge) in granting the mandamus uttered
these potent sentences in answer to the argument of being
licensees of a patentee :

"I believe fully in the sacred.

ness of property ; but I think all property stands upon
an equal basis whether that property consists of gold
dollars in your pocket, real estate or the ownership of
a patent.

There is no peculiar sanctity hovering over or

attaching to the ownership of a patent.

It

a property right to be protected as such.
from that as a basis,

is

simply

Starting

while every property owner may de-

termine for himself to what he will devote his property,
yet the moment he puts that property into what I perhaps
may, for the lack of a better expression, define as a
channel

ty

of coirnerce,

that moment he subjects

that proper-

to the laws which control coruniercial transactions,

20
just as has been held in regard to warehouse, railroad
and express charges."

Legislatures and courts can mo-

modify leases and licenses, and control duties.
moment the licensor, the Ain. Bell Teleph. Co.,

"The
permitted

the establishnent of a telephonic system here, that moment it put such telephonic system within the control of
the state of Missouri, and the control of the courts,
enforcing the obligations of a coimmon carrier.

A tele-

phonic system is simply a system for the transmission
of intelligence

and news.

It is, perhaps, in a limited

sense, and yet in a strict sense, a comnon carrier.
It must be equal in its dealings with all.

It cannot

open its system to doctors and not to lawyers."

(State

of Mo. ex rel. B.: O.Tel. Co. v 'ell Teleph. Co.(local),
23 Fed. Rep. 539.)
connection to

But he acnitted that if it refused

the Western Union it could refuse

facilities to the relator.

the same

This admission shows a nar-

rowing down of the doctrine of Judge Thayer in the St.
Louis case.
ground that the

District Judge Treat dissented on the
court had not jurisdiction of the licen-

sor and distinguished the Ohio case from the Connecticut
case in that respect.

(So it is to be noted here that

the U.S. Circuit Court has decided-U-U.S. v Bell Teleph

Co.,29 Fed.

Rep.

17-that

the

kn.

Bell Teleph.

Co.

is

not doing business in Ohio by allowing its licensees to
use its instruments there, and that service upon an officer of

one of the local companies is not a ffood ser-

vice on it.

And yet it was there admitted, and offi-

cial investigations have shown, that the Massachusetts
Company owns stock in nearly all these local companies.)
The case was certified to the U.S. Supreme Court

; but

since the Bell Company and the W. U. Telegraph Co. have
adopted their old tactics
B.&

0. Telegraph Co.,

in buying in recently the

it is doubtful if that highest

court will very soon decide the question.
A year later,

the B.& 0. Tel.

Co.

brought before

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the same question of
the right of a telephone company to supply the Western
Union with an instrument and refuse the complainant the
same privilege.
Tel. Co.,

(Bell Teleph. Co. v Com. ex rel. D.&

65 Al. L. J. 4

; 3 Cent. Rep. 907.)

0.

That

court adopted without dissent the opinion of the judge of
the lower court,

that the company must supply the com-

plainant with a telephone.

The telephone

company here

put in a new defense that by a contract with VW.U.Tel. CO.
to settle all their litigation as to telephone patents,

the American Bell Telephone Co. agreed to give

the

Uestern Union Telegraph Co. the exclusive vight to use
the exchanges to collect

telegraphic dispatches.

The

judge replied that the contract was void because telephone companies are governed by the rules applied to
coirnon carriers

; further, that the Pennsylvania statute

as to discrimination by telegraph companies applies here;
that the Al. Bell Co. was not an indispensable party; and
that the opinion in the Ohio case expressed the proper
view of the situation.

Last year the Court of Appeals

of MJiaryland gave an opinion upon a similar state of
facts.
Co.,

(Chesapeake & Potomac Teleph. CO. v B.&

'55 Al. L.J. 2'71.)

0. Tel.

They ruled that telegraph and

telephone companies are public vehicles of intelligence
and are required to be impartial by a law, the same as
the laws of Ohio and Connecticut

; that such laws are

constitutional has been settled by Munn v Illinois (94
U.S. 113)
the instrnents

; that licensing exchanges at once dedicates
to the public

; that the use of a patent-

ed article can be controlled by a state

; and that the

reasoning the Ohio and Philadelphia cases was the better.
New York also has begun to make law in this particular branch of the telephone discussion.

Upon an applic:-

23
tion to a Special Term of the Supreme

Court for a mandam-

us to compel the Hudson River Telephone Co.
the office of the Postal Telegraph
exchange,

Justice Parker,

in

to connect

Cable Co. with its

May 1887,

rendered an opin-

ion which shows a close scrutiny of the subject.
ple v Hudson River Teleph. CO.,
N.Y. S. R. 282)

Ile says

19 Abb. 11.

C. 466

(Peo; 10

: "The owner of a patent has

the right to determine whether or not any use shall be
made of his invention, and, if any, what such use shall
be.

When, however, he determines upon its use his legal

duty to the public requires that all persons shall, in
respect to it, be treated alike, without injurious discrimination as to rates or conditions.

The authorities

establish the principle that a public servant, as the
defendant is,

cannot so use the invention protected by

the government, as to withhold from one citizen the

ad-

vantages which it accords to another ; and it follows
that the relator in this case on compliance with the
usual terms, and reasonable regulations of the defendant,
is entitled to have mandamus issue directing
placing of one

the

of its telephones in relator's office."

The relator complained that two of the regulations of
the telephone company were unreasonable.

Judge Parker
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said that the first-that the telephones are not to be
used for any part of the work of collecting, transmitting
or delivering any message in respect of which any toll
has been or is
exchange-

is

to be paid to any party other than the
reasonable,

cannot

for one common carrier

demand, as a right, that it be permitted to use a rival
coirnon carrier's property for the benefit of its own
business (Barney v 0. B. & H. Steamboat Co.,70 N.Y.301.
Express Cases,

i17 U.S. l.Iiow the parties are rivals as

to the transmission of dispatches beyond the territorial
limits of the telephone company is not apparent.); nor
does the New York statute require it.

(Laws of 1845

Ch. 265,sec. 11 as amended L.of 1855, Ch. 559

; 2 R. S.

1719.

The law of 1845 is almost identical with the Ohio,

Penn.,

Conn. & 1d. statutes.

But Ch. 559 of L.1855 con-

tains the proviso that the statute of 1845 shall not require

a

patches

dis-

telegraph company to receive or transnit
from or for a

company owning a line

of telegraph

parallel with or doing business in competition with the
line

over which the dispatch is

required to be

But he says that the second regulation-

sent.)

that the

tele-

phone shall not be used for calling messengers except
from the Central Office-is unreasonable and void.
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"The messenger business

is a distinct and separate busi-

ness, and in no wise essential to the conduct of the
defendent's system of transmitting messages by telephone
for which it was incorporated.

To extend the rule pro-

tecting its business from rivals, so as to include any
other business in which it might see fit to engage,
could result in great injustice to the public.

The

Louisville Transfer Co. v Am. Dist. Teleph. Co. is applicable here."

And it was further ordered that after

three months use of the telephone,

the defendants may

apply for an order to settle what shall be a reasonable
compensation.
authorities,

From this ,perhaps lengthy review of the
it must be seen that the decision of the

Ohio Court laying down the duties of the telephone Company is the one most generally followed in this country
(27 Al. L.J.242) and requires a telephone company to supply an instrument to any telegraph company

asking for

it.
Only once is it reported that a telephone

company

refused to open its facilities to any individuals.
Lawyer in Lincoln, Neb.,

A

refused to pay a telephone Com-

pany the rent for a time when he was not supplied with a
directory of subscribers

; and the company removed his
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instruinont
premo

; he sought

Court of Nebraska in an able opinion (State v N eb.

Teleph. Co.,
vory

The Su-

the aid of the courts.

; 52 Ain. Rep. 4.04)

17Neb. 126

thoroughly

to

of the telephone

the relation

public and hold that in

discussed
the

had ten-

as much as the relator

dered the amounts required of other subscribers the tolephone company was bound to furnish him with a complete
; its remedy for the rent claimed to

set of instruments

So much for one

be due was by an action for the same.
branches

of the most interesting
In

the line

graph companies,

of telephone law.

of our previous reasoning,
telephone

li]:e tele-

companies must employ compe-

tent anL skillful operators and other agents and ser vants in all respects competent for the discharge of
their principal duties, and see that these have skill
and that they apply it.
Tel. Oases, 578,581
other words,

in

(Graham v VI.U.Tol.Co. Allen's

; 10 Ain. L.Reg. N.S. 319)

the absence of special

Or, in

contract,

are bound to transmit messages and operate their
changes with care and diligence adequate
which they undertake.
132.
that

Wolfskehl v

.U.Tel.

they
ex-

to the business

(Breese v U.S.

Tel.

Co.,48 N.Y.

12 I,.Y.

S.R.

555.)

Co.,

And

has been held in telegraph cases to mean the high-
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est degree of care and diligence.
Co.,

U. Tel.

(Graham v Yf.

supra. W.U. Tel. Co. v Carew 15 Tlich. 525,533.)

But it is plain that a telephone company would not be
obliged to employ telegraph operators

; persons

compe-

tent and skillful in the manipulation of the telephone
For a broach of this duty,

are all that are required.

the company would be liable to an injured party.
telephone lawyer writes :

A

"I suppose it will be confessed

that whore one subscriber talks directly with another,
there is no question of responsibility on the part of
(18 An. J.of So.

company."

the

telephone

No,

it will not

; it should be liable for damages arisinr,
instruments

from defective

Sei. 163.)

or lines

or from negligence

at the central office of the exchange.
Whenever we send a telephone
quired to write
at

our message on a blank which contains

the top an agreement

blanks,

that the

dispatch, we are re-

similar to that used on telegraph

company shall

errors, mistakes or delays

in

not be held liable
transmitting,

for

receiving,

delivering or forwarding the message, nor for non-delivery, however

occuring, beyond the amount paid for its

transmission, nor unless a claim therefor be presented
in writing within thirty days after sending the message.
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Even though one has never read that agreement, by writing
his message below it he is estopped from denying that he
assented to
113 JIass.

the terms of it.

299.

(Grinnell v W.U.Tel. Co.,

Breese v U.S. Tel. Co.,

48 N.Y. 132.)

Undoubtedly the provision limiting the time within which
claims must be presented is reasonable

; for a similar

limit of sixty days on telegraph messages which may be
sent enormous distances has been hold reasonable.
(Young v W.U.Tel. Co.,
dith, 95 Ind.

93.)

in a contract with

65 N.Y. 163. W.U.Tel. Co. v Mere-

The other stipulation against loss
a telegraph company would be held

void in Maine, Illinois or Wisconsin.
Tel. Co.,

62 1.e.

209. Ayer v Telegraph Co.,

W.U.Tel. Co. v Tyler, 74 Ill. 168.
34 Wis. 471.)

(Bartlett v W.U.
79 11e.

493.

Candee v 71.U.Tel.

Co.

For like other coimrion carriers they can-

not stipulate against their own negligence.

In many

other states--particularly, Massachusetts (Grinnell v
W.U.Tel.

Co.,113 Mass.

299),

New York,

Nebraska and

lich-

igan-- these companies can by contract relieve themselves
from liability except for gross negligemce, wilful misconduct or fraud on their own part or that of their agents.
The modus oporandi of telephoning being simpler than
telegraphy, telephone companies should not be allowed to
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stipulate against any negligence.

Ilor should they be

allowed to limit the damages in case of failure or delay in transmission, mistake or delay in delivery, or
non-delivery of a message to the amount of toll paid.
Amd they will, undoubtedly, be held liable for such damages as

nay directly ensue to the receiver in consequence

of their tardiness or misdelivery

of a message,

whenever

this appears inexcusable or to be a negligent performance
of their duty to the public.

(Schouler on 2ailinents

note, page 278. Yfolfskehl v W. U. Tel. Co.,

12 N.Y.S.R.

555.)

Telephone Legislation.
Under the police power by which it is customary to
regulate

the charges of ferrymen,

men, bakers, innkeepers, etc.,

common carriers,

hack-

the state legislatures

can pass laws fixing the maxiinmn charges for telephone
instruments and service.
5 N.E. Rep. 178.)

(Iocket v State, 105 Ind.

250;

Ind the companies are bound to furnish

the organized apparatus or the usual and necessary coinbination of instrumnents for the transmission and reception of telephone messages.

For a state can do what-

ever is necessary to pronote public welfare, not inconsistent with its own organic laws.

The use of patented
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articles

must be in

a state.

subordination to the regulations

of

The telephone exchange is not a private enter-

prise or club, but an indispensable instrument of commerce
which has been devoted to the public and therefore has
become the ligitimate

subject of legislative control.

(Marehouse Cases 94 U. S. 113.)

But where a state law

imposes a certain tax upon telephone companies in lieu
of all other taxes, a city of that state cannot require
them to pay a license for the privilege of doing business
within its limits.
62 Wis.

32.)

Where a

nance allowing a

(Wis. Teleph. Co. v City of Oskosh,
common council has passed an ordi-

telephone

company

to occupy certain

streets and it has coinenced the erection of poles, the
designation cannot be revoked. (Hudson Teleph. Co. v Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 303)
utes

on the

subject,

And where

telephone

there are no stat-

property and lines

should

be assessed in the mode provided for assessing telegraph
lines and property.

(Iowa

Union Teleph.

Equalization, 25 N. W. Rep. 155.)
adjudications as to

Co.

v Board of

These are the few

the relations of telephone companies

to the statutes.
Evidence of Telephonic Transactions.
Many contracts

are made and many business arrange-

ments consumated

through the

cision of cases wherein the

telephone.

telephone is

And the dea link in

the

evidence is bound to give rise to considerable discussion
On the grounds which we have

so often reiterated,

questions as to offer and acceptance

all

by telephone

dispatches must be decided on the same principles
apply

in

similar transactions by telegraph.

that

But how

shall statements made through a telephone be proved ?
Sullivan v Kuykendall (decided January 1885,
56 Ain. R. 901;

82 Ky. 483 ;

) was the earliest and

24 Am. L. Reg. 442

is the most thoroughly considered decision that we have
on this subject.

A wishing to corrmunicate with B in-

duces the operator at X to call up

the operator at Y

where B is and ask B to talk with the operator at X, because A

is not accustomed

phone.

The operator at Y telephones that B is at the

office

; and

then a

to talking

conversation

through the

tele-

takes place between B

and the operator at X, who comnunicates what comes over
the wire

to A

and

third persons present,

by A what the reply shall be.
action on a

contract for the

and the conversation was in
same.

and is

informed

The point came up in an
sale of personal property

regard to the delivery of

the

The operator at X testified that he had a conver-

sation on the

day named with soire one

at Y

; but he

A and the bystanders

could not recollect what was said.

the opera-

were allowed in the lower court to state what

ted

B admit-

X reported to them as being said by 3.

tor at

that a conversation took place; but his testimony

and that of A and his witnesSes differed widely as to
what was said.

The bare question is whether

the testi-

mony of A and the bystanders is competent or falls withThe

in the domain of incompetent hearsay evidence.
Suprem

Court of Kentucky truly says that "it is a ques-

tion of importance

, in view of the astonishing

growth

of the business to which it relates and one not free from
difficulty."

In transactions by telegraph, the

grams and copies are evidence.

tele-

If the parties talk

through a telephone themselves, inventive genius may be
said to

have eliminated space and it is as if they were

talking face to face.
the operator at

But the court ruled that B made

X his agent and what

to A was admissible.

They said that the agency is sim-

ilar to that of an interpreter.
statement

the operator said

The interpreter's

made at the time of what was so said is com-

petent evidence against the party

; and the interpreter

need not be called ; but his statement made at

the time
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may be proved by third persons who were present and heard
it.

The

reason of the rule

is that the interpreter is

the agent of both acting within the
ment.

scope of his employ-

It is true that the persons cannot see each

other

; nor could a blind man who was using an interpret-

er.

With the

expansion of business and the appearance

of new instruients of coinnerce,
rules of evidence.

given to the
as to agent

a wider scope must be
The rule of evidence

and principal is certainly the one to be

applied in this case because a person using a telephone
knows that there is one at each station whose business
it is to so act ; and the
ness require this rule.

'necessities of a growing busiThe court further

says : "The

argument is at least plausible, if not correct, that

the

testimony in question is competent as a part of the
There

res gestae, aside from the question of agency."

was an able dissenting opinion which has been favorably
cormnented upon (22 Cent. L. J. 34 ), and which holds that
the operator at X is the agent of A who has selected the
means of communication, and not the

agent of B, and that

the stateirent of the operator that he is empowered by B
to speak for him is not the best evidence of the
his authority.

It would seem that the

scope of

court in its

decision has given up

the principles which have been

heretofore applied to the

coumuunication

of contracts by

special messenger, mail or telegraph.
In the

trial of the

"Napoleon of Finance", Fish was

allowed by Judge Barrett to testify as to what

Ward

said to him in a conversation over a telephone line, a
fact which was essential in proving the crime.
v Ward, 3 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 483,511.)

(People

And another wit-

ness who stood about six inches from the telephone was
also allowed to testify as to the conversation, both
witnesses personally testifying that they had had conversations on that line with Ward and at the
question recognized his voice.

titne

in

The London Law Tiires

(28 Al. L. J. 422), prior to the Ward trial, in commenting upon a case where a witness was allowed to testify
that he recognized the voice of the prisoner and that a
certain conversation took place,said : "A conversation
through a telephone is so different from a conversation
face to face, that it appears
can be allowed to stand on the
purpose of evidence.

to us doubtful whether it
saire footing for the

Only the other day a barrister's

clerk perpetrated extensive frauds by giving instructions
by telephone in his master's voice.

And on account of

the fact that a voice is often imperfectly reproduced,
a court would probably feel some doubt about admitting
conversations unless further evidence
the

speaker was given."

ing says

of the identity of

The Albany Law Journal assent-

: " vex et practerea nihii is very

evidence."

umsafe

But it does not appear whether there was

any further evidence of identity in the Ward case than
the recognition of the prisoner's voice
giving quite a loop hole for wrong.

;

The doctrine of

"face to face" in the use of the telephone,
was so strongly accepted at first

and that is

it is said,

that notaries public

in the West got into the habit of taking affidavits by
telephone after they had the

signed affidavit in hand.

The argument of certainty of recognition was answered by
saying that notaries are not required by law to be and
are not generally sure of the identity of their affiant.
But sanctity of oath is largely
the

officer.

due

to the

presence of

And laziness and inconvenience should

not leave a door open to perjury and fraud.

